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Abstract: This paper reconsiders whether cabdrivers’ labor supply decisions reflect 
reference-dependent preferences. Following Botond Kıszegi and Matthew Rabin (2006), we 
construct a model with targets for hours as well as income, both determined by rational 
expectations. Estimating using Henry S. Farber’s (2005, 2008) data, we show that the 
reference-dependent model can reconcile his 2005 finding that drivers’ stopping probabilities are 
significantly related to hours but not income with the negative wage elasticity of hours found by 
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New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent 
Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income 
In the absence of large income effects, the neoclassical model of labor supply predicts a 
positive wage elasticity of hours. However, Camerer et al. (1997), collecting data on the daily 
labor supply decisions of New York City cabdrivers, who unlike most workers in modern 
economies are free to choose their own hours, found a strongly negative elasticity of hours with 
respect to realized earnings, especially for inexperienced drivers. Farber (2005, 2008), analyzing 
new data on a different set of New York City cabdrivers, found a similarly negative relationship.  
To explain their results, Camerer et al. informally proposed a model in which drivers have 
daily income targets and work until the target is reached, and so work less on days when realized 
earnings per hour (the natural analog of the wage in this setting, which we call the “wage” from 
now on) is high. This explanation is in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) and Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1991) Prospect Theory, in which a person’s preferences respond not only to 
income as usually assumed, but also to a reference point; and there is “loss aversion” in that the 
person is more sensitive to changes in income below the reference point (“losses”) than changes 
above it (“gains”). In the explanation, a driver’s reference point is a daily income target and loss 
aversion creates a kink that tends to make realized income bunch around the target, so realized 
hours have little or none of the positive wage elasticity predicted by the neoclassical model. 
As Farber (2008, p. 1069) notes, a finding that labor supply is reference-dependent would 
have significant policy implications: 
“Evaluation of much government policy regarding tax and transfer programs depends on 
having reliable estimates of the sensitivity of labor supply to wage rates and income 
levels. To the extent that individuals’ levels of labor supply are the result of optimization 
with reference-dependent preferences, the usual estimates of wage and income elasticities 
are likely to be misleading.”  
But Farber finds mixed evidence for income targeting in the empirical literature on labor 
supply with flexible hours. Farber (2005) found that before controlling for driver fixed effects, the 
probability of stopping work is significantly related to income realized on a given day, but that 
driver fixed effects and other relevant controls render this effect statistically insignificant. And 
other studies of workers who choose their hours have found positive relationships between   2 
expected earnings and labor supply, as suggested by the neoclassical model.
2 
Farber (2008) reexamines the evidence, using his 2005 dataset to estimate a model explicitly 
derived from reference-dependence with daily income targeting that goes beyond the informal 
explanations that motivated previous work. He estimates drivers’ income targets as latent 
variables with driver-specific means and driver-independent variance, both assumed constant 
across days of the week—thus allowing the target to vary across days for a given driver, but only 
as a random effect.
3 He finds that a sufficiently rich parameterization of his reference-dependent 
model has a better fit than a standard neoclassical specification, and that the probability of 
stopping increases significantly and substantially once the income target is reached; but that his 
model cannot reconcile the strong increase in stopping probability at the target with the aggregate 
smoothness of the relationship between stopping probability and realized income. Further, the 
random effect turns out to be large but imprecisely estimated, from which he concludes that 
drivers’ income targets are too unstable and imprecisely estimated to yield a useful 
reference-dependent model of labor supply (p. 1078): 
“There is substantial inter-shift variation, however, around the mean reference income 
level. …To the extent that this represents daily variation in the reference income level for 
a particular driver, the predictive power of the reference income level for daily labor 
supply would be quite limited.”  
Partly in response to Camerer et al.’s (1997) and Farber’s (2005, 2008) analyses, Kıszegi and 
Rabin (2006) developed a theory of reference-dependent preferences that is more general than 
Farber’s in most respects but takes a more specific position on how targets are determined (see 
also Kıszegi and Rabin (2007, 2009)). In Kıszegi and Rabin’s (2006, Section V) theory as 
applied to cabdrivers’ labor supply, a driver has a daily target for hours as well as income. His 
preferences reflect both the standard consumption utility of income and leisure and 
                                                        
2 As Kıszegi and Rabin (2006, p. 1150) put it: “While strongly disagreeing about the extent of this behavior and whether it is 
irrational, Camerer et al. (1997) and Farber [(2005, 2008)] analyzing New York city taxi drivers all ﬁnd a negative relationship 
between earnings early in the day and duration of work later in the day. Studies analyzing participation decisions as a function of 
expected wages, on the other hand, ﬁnd a positive relationship between earnings and effort: [Gerald S.] Oettinger (1999) ﬁnds that 
stadium vendors are more likely to go to work on days when their wage can be expected to be higher, and [Ernst Fehr and Lorenz 
Goette (2007)] show bicycle messengers sign up for more shifts when their commission is experimentally increased.” (Fehr and 
Goette (2007) found that the wage elasticity of hours worked was positive but that of work effort was negative. They argued that 
effort is a more accurate measure of labor supply and concluded that messengers’ supply was reference-dependent.) 
3 Constancy across days of the week is a strong restriction. In the sample, Friday has the highest average income ($198.43), while 
Tuesday has the lowest ($164.31), with Friday’s, Saturday’s, and Sunday’s incomes systematically higher than those of other days. 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank tests reject the hypotheses that average daily income or hours is constant across days 
of the week (p-values < 0.0001). Farber includes day-of-the-week dummies in his main specifications of the stopping probability 
equation, but this turns out to be an imperfect substitute for allowing the mean income target to vary across days of the week. 
   3 
reference-dependent “gain-loss” utility, with their relative importance tuned by an estimated 
parameter. As in single-target models like Farber’s (2008), the driver is loss-averse; but working 
longer than the hours target is a loss, just as earning less than the income target is. Finally, and 
most importantly for our analysis, reflecting the belief that drivers in steady state learn to predict 
their daily hours and income with reasonable accuracy, Kıszegi and Rabin endogenize the targets 
by setting a driver’s targets equal to his theoretical rational expectations of hours and income.
4 
This paper reconsiders whether reference-dependent preferences allow a useful model of 
cabdrivers’ labor supply, using Farber’s data to estimate a model based on Kıszegi and Rabin’s 
(2006) theory. We closely follow Farber’s (2005, 2008) econometric strategies, but instead of 
treating targets as latent variables we treat them as rational expectations, operationalized by using 
average sample realizations of income and hours as proxies for them. (Proxying the targets by 
functions of endogenous variables creates some simultaneity problems, which we deal with as 
explained below.) Further, in the structural estimation that parallels Farber’s (2008) analysis, we 
allow for consumption as well as gain-loss utility and hours as well as income targets. 
Section I introduces our adaptation of Kıszegi and Rabin’s model of reference-dependent 
preferences to cabdrivers’ daily labor supply decisions. If the weight of gain-loss utility is small, 
the model approaches a neoclassical model, with standard implications for labor supply. Even 
when gain-loss utility has larger weight, the standard implications carry over for changes in the 
wage that are perfectly anticipated, because gain-loss utility then drops out of the driver’s 
calculation. But when realized wages deviate from expected wages, his probability of stopping is 
more strongly influenced by hours or income, depending on which target is reached first, and the 
model’s implications may deviate substantially from those of a neoclassical model. When the 
realized wage is lower than expected, the hours target tends to be reached before the income target, 
hours have a stronger influence on the stopping probability than realized income, and the wage 
elasticity of labor supply is pushed toward zero. But when the realized wage is higher than 
expected, the income target tends to be reached first, and its stronger influence on the stopping 
probability can make even a driver who values income but is “rational” in the generalized 
reference-dependent sense of Prospect Theory have a negative wage elasticity. 
                                                        
4  There can be multiple expectations that are consistent with the individual’s optimal behavior, given the expectations. Kıszegi 
and Rabin use a refinement, “preferred personal equilibrium,” to focus on the self-confirming expectations that are best for the 
individual. Most previous analyses have identified reference points with the status quo, but as Kıszegi and Rabin note most of the 
evidence does not distinguish these interpretations because expectations are usually close to the status quo. Even so, we shall argue 
that their rational-expectations view of targets has important substantive implications for modeling cabdrivers’ behavior.     4 
Section II reports our econometric estimates. We begin in Sections II.1-2 by estimating linear 
and nonlinear probit models of the probability of stopping as in Farber’s (2005) analysis, using his 
data but splitting the sample according to whether a given driver’s realized wage on a given day is 
higher or lower than our sample proxy for his rational-expectations wage. A reference-dependent 
model like ours predicts large differences in stopping probabilities across these two regimes, 
independent of the details of the structure. This sharply distinguishes it from a neoclassical model 
even if our proxy for expectations is imperfect, which allows a robust assessment of the gains 
from a reference-dependent model, avoiding most restrictions needed for structural estimation. 
In our split-sample estimates, when the realized wage is higher than expected, so that the 
income target is likely to be reached first, the stopping probability is strongly influenced by 
realized income but not hours; and when the wage is lower than expected so that the hours target 
is likely to be reached first, the stopping probability is strongly influenced by hours but not 
income. This qualitative pattern deviates significantly from the predictions of a neoclassical 
model, but is just as predicted by our reference-dependent model. 
Because the wage elasticity of labor supply is negative in the former wage regime but near 
zero in the latter, the aggregate wage elasticity is likely to be negative. Thus, Kıszegi and Rabin’s 
distinction between anticipated and unanticipated wage increases can resolve the apparent 
contradiction between the positive incentive to work created by an anticipated wage increase with 
a negative aggregate wage elasticity.
5 Further, because the two regimes have roughly equal 
weights in the sample, the heterogeneity of realized wages yields a smooth aggregate relationship 
between stopping probability and realized income, so the model can also reconcile Farber’s (2005) 
finding that aggregate stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with 
a negative aggregate wage elasticity of hours as found by Camerer et al. (1997). 
Section II.3 uses the full sample to estimate a structural reference-dependent model as in 
Farber (2008), but with the changes suggested by Kıszegi and Rabin’s theory described above. 
Because of the way the weight of gain-loss utility and the coefficient of loss aversion interact in 
our model, they are not separately identified. However, a simple function of them is identified, 
                                                        
5 As Kıszegi and Rabin put it (p. 1136): “In line with the empirical results of the target-income literature, our model predicts that 
when drivers experience unexpectedly high wages in the morning, for any given afternoon wage they are less likely to continue 
work. Yet expected wage increases will tend to increase both willingness to show up to work, and to drive in the afternoon once 
there. Our model therefore replicates the key insight of the literature that exceeding a target income might reduce effort. But in 
addition, it both provides a theory of what these income targets will be, and—through the fundamental distinction between 
unexpected and expected wages—avoids the unrealistic prediction that generically higher wages will lower effort.” 
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and our estimates of this function allow inferences that confirm and refine the conclusions of our 
split-sample analysis. Like our split-sample estimates, our structural estimates imply significant 
influences of income and hours targets on stopping probabilities in the pattern implied by Kıszegi 
and Rabin’s multi-targeting model. They also reconcile the aggregate smoothness of the 
relationship between stopping probability and realized income with the negative aggregate wage 
elasticity of hours. Our structural model avoids Farber’s (2008) criticism that drivers’ targets are 
too unstable to allow a useful model of labor supply partly by nesting consumption and gain-loss 
utility and allowing hours as well as income targets, but mostly by treating the targets as rational 
expectations estimated from natural sample proxies, rather than as latent variables. 
Section III is the conclusion. 
 
I. The Model   
This section introduces our model, which adapts Kıszegi and Rabin’s (2006) theory of 
reference-dependent preferences to cabdrivers’ labor supply decisions.
6 
Treating each day separately as in all previous analyses, consider the preferences of a given 
driver during his shift on a given day.
7  Let I and H denote his income earned and hours worked 
that day, and let I
r and H
r denote his income and hours targets for the day. We write the driver’s 
total utility, V(I, H|I
r,H
r), as a weighted average of consumption utility U1(I) + U2(H) and 
gain-loss utility R(I, H|I
r,H
r), with weights 1 – η and η (where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1), as follows:
8 
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Because to our knowledge this is the first empirical test of Kıszegi and Rabin’s theory, for 
simplicity and parsimony (1)-(2) incorporate some assumptions that they made provisionally: 
Consumption utility is additively separable across income and hours, with U1(·) increasing in I, 
                                                        
6 Kıszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model treats drivers’ targets as stochastic, with gain-loss utility defined as the expectation of terms 
like those in our specification. Because their theoretical model makes no allowance for errors, they need stochastic targets for gains 
and losses to occur. Because the errors that describe sampling variation in our model generate gains and losses even if drivers have 
point expectations, we simplify their model by treating targets as deterministic. Deterministic targets may exaggerate the effect of 
loss aversion, and if anything they bias the comparison against Kıszegi and Rabin’s model and in favor of the neoclassical model. 
7 A driver sometimes works different shifts (day or night) on different days but never more than one a day. Given that drivers seem 
to form daily targets, it is natural to treat the shift, or equivalently the driver-day combination, as the unit of analysis.     
8 Kıszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) use a different parameterization, in which consumption utility has weight 1 and gain-loss utility 
has weight η. Thus our parameter η is a simple transformation of their parameter with the same name. In more recent work, 
Kıszegi and Rabin (2009) suggest allowing η to differ for hours and income, but we avoid this complication.    6 
U2(·) decreasing in H, and both concave.
9 Gain-loss utility is also additively separable, 
determined component by component by the differences between realized and target consumption 
utilities. As in a leading case Kıszegi and Rabin sometimes focus on (their Assumption A3’), 
gain-loss utility is a linear function of those utility differences, thus ruling out Prospect Theory’s 
“diminishing sensitivity.” Finally, losses have a constant weight λ relative to gains, “the 
coefficient of loss aversion,” which is the same for income and hours. 
We follow Kıszegi and Rabin in equating the income and hours targets I
r and H
r to drivers’ 
rational expectations. Empirically, we proxy drivers’ expectations by their natural sample analogs, 
setting a driver’s targets on a given day of the week equal to the analogous full-sample means for 
that day of the week, thus allowing the targets to vary across days of the week as suggested by the 
variation of hours and income (footnote 3), but ignoring sampling variation for simplicity. 
Because drivers’ earnings are determined randomly rather than by a known wage rate, drivers 
must form expectations after each trip about their earnings per hour if they continue work that day. 
Drivers face a difficult signal-extraction problem, and Farber (2005, Section V.C) argues, based 
on a careful and detailed econometric analysis, that hourly earnings are so variable that 
“predicting hours of work with a model that assumes a ﬁxed hourly wage rate during the day does 
not seem appropriate.” Instead he estimates a value of continuing (defined to include any option 
value of continuing beyond one more trip) as a latent variable and assumes that a driver’s stopping 
decision is determined by comparing this value to the cost of continuing. Despite Farber’s critique, 
because of the complexity of optimal stopping with hours as well as income targets we illustrate 
our model’s possibilities as simply as possible, by assuming that drivers extrapolate their daily 
income linearly, assuming a constant expected hourly wage rate w
a and ignoring option value.
10 
We further assume that drivers have rational expectations of w
a, which we proxy by their natural 
sample analogs, the driver’s realized daily wages for that day of the week in the full sample.
11  
                                                        
9 In keeping with the “narrow bracketing” assumption that drivers evaluate consumption and gain-loss utility one day at a time, 
U1(I) should be thought of as a reduced form, partly reflecting the future value of income not spent today. 
10 Although the expected wage rate is assumed to be constant, our model and structural estimation allow the realized wage rate to 
vary. Our assumptions imply that option value is zero, but a richer model predicting the fare and time of the next trip, as considered 
in Section II.3, might make it positive. Even so, it seems a reasonable approximation to ignore it, as Thierry Post et al. (2008) do.        
11 Farber’s (2008) estimation of continuation value as a latent variable and our assumption that drivers have rational expectations 
and extrapolate income linearly are alternative first-order proxies for globally optimal stopping conditions that depend on 
unobservables, which both yield coherent results despite their imperfections. As noted above, our proxying the targets by functions 
of endogenous variables creates simultaneity problems, which are exacerbated by the small samples for some drivers. In Section 
II.1-2’s split-sample estimates our approximation makes little difference, because the theory’s implications as tested there are 
robust to imperfections in the criterion for splitting. In Section II.3’s structural estimation simultaneity problems are potentially 
important. Given the lack of suitable instruments, we consider an alternative proxy using a driver’s sample means without allowing 
day-of-the-week differences, which makes the samples large enough that the simultaneity is negligible and yields similar results.   7 
Given our assumptions about expectations formation and the universal empirical finding that λ 
≥ 1—loss rather than gain aversion—our model allows a simple characterization of a driver’s 
optimal stopping decision with targets for hours as well as income, which parallels Farber’s (2005, 
2008) characterizations. When a driver extrapolates income linearly, his optimal stopping 
decision maximizes reference-dependent utility V(I, H|I
r,H
r) as in (1) and (2), subject to the linear 
menu of income-hours combinations I = w
aH. When U1(·) and U2(·) are concave, V(I, H|I
r, H
r) is 
concave in I and H for any given targets I
r and H
r. Thus the driver’s decision is characterized by a 
first-order condition, generalized to allow kinks at the reference points: He continues if the 
anticipated wage w
a exceeds the relevant marginal rate of substitution and stops otherwise.
12 
Table 1 lists the marginal rates of substitution in the interiors of the four possible gain-loss 
regions, expressed as hours disutility costs of an additional unit of income. Under our assumptions 
that gain-loss utility is additively separable and determined component by component by the 
difference between realized and target consumption utilities, when hours and income are both in 
the interior of the gains or the loss domain, the marginal rate of substitution is the same as for 
consumption utilities alone, so the stopping decision satisfies the standard neoclassical first-order 
condition. But when hours and income are in the interiors of opposite domains, the marginal rate 
of substitution equals the consumption-utility trade-off times a factor that reflects the weight of 
gain-loss utility and the coefficient of loss aversion, either (1 – η + ηλ) or 1/(1 – η + ηλ). On the 
boundaries between regions, where I = I
r and/or H = H
r, the marginal rates of substitution are 
replaced by generalized derivatives whose left- and right-hand values equal the interior values. 
Figure 1, in which hours are measured negatively as a “bad,” illustrates the driver’s optimal 
stopping decision when w
a > w
e, so that realized income is higher than expected and the income 
target is reached before the hours target (w
a = I/H > w
e and H = H
r = I
r/w






r). The case where w
a < w
e (not shown), is completely analogous, but with the hours target 
reached before the income target. Letting It and Ht denote income earned and hours worked by the 
end of trip t, the driver starts in the lower right-hand corner, with (Ht, It) = (0, 0), and anticipates 
moving along a sample line I = w
aH with constant w
a. As the hours pass, his income increases 
along a random but monotone path (not shown), heading northwest. His realized path is a step 
function, but because the mean trip length is only about 12 minutes (Farber (2005, Section V)), 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
We also consider an alternative in which drivers’ fare and trip time expectations are allowed to depend on time and location as in 
Farber’s (2005, Section V.C) analysis, which confirms the main messages of our basic analysis. 
12 More general specifications that allow diminishing sensitivity do not imply that V(I, H|I
r, H
r) is everywhere concave in I and H. 
Although they probably still allow an analysis like ours, as do other expectations formation rules, we avoid these complications.    8 
the path can be approximated as continuous, and I and H treated as continuous variables. 
 
Table 1. Marginal Rates of Substitution with Reference-Dependent Preferences by Domain 
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Figure 1: A Reference-dependent Driver’s Stopping Decision 
The three indifference curves in Figure 1 with tangency points B1, B2, and B3 represent 
alternative possible income-hours trade-offs for consumption utility, ignoring gain-loss utility. 
Starting at (It, Ht) = (0, 0), in the income-loss/hours-gain (It < I
r, Ht < H
r) domain, the driver 
continues working as long as the anticipated wage w
a exceeds the hours disutility cost of an 
additional unit of income,  ] 1 /[ )] ( ' / ) ( ' [ 1 2 hl h + - - t t I U H U  from the lower left cell of Table 1. 
Because in this domain hours are cheap relative to income ((1 – η + ηλ) ≥ 1 when 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and λ ≥ 
1), this comparison favors working more than the neoclassical one w
a
 ≥ ) ( ' / ) ( ' 1 2 t t I U H U - . 
As hours and income accumulate through the day, either the hours disutility cost of income 
rises to w
a before the driver reaches his first target— with w
a > w
e, income as in Figure 1—and 
leaves the income-loss/hours-gain domain; or the hours disutility cost remains below w
a until he 
   
w
a > w
e     
 
 
r  H   
r  I 
 
t  H 
t  I     
                 
1  B   
2  B  
3  B     
3  A 
 
1  A
   9 
reaches his income target. In the former case he stops at a point weakly between points B1 and A1, 
where B1 represents the hours and income that would maximize consumption utility on 
indifference curve 1, and A1 represents (I
r/w
a, I
r). Other things equal, the closer η is to one and the 
larger is λ ≥ 1, the closer the stopping point is to A1 on the segment from B1 to A1. 
In the latter case, he compares the cost in the domain he is entering—in this case 
income-gain/hours-gain (It > I
r, Ht < H
r)—and stops if the new hours disutility cost of income, 
) ( ' / ) ( ' 1 2 I U H U -  from the upper left cell of Table 1, exceeds w
a. In that case, the optimal 
stopping point is A1. If, instead,  ) ( ' / ) ( ' 1 2 I U H U -  < w
a, the driver continues working. Then 
either the hours disutility cost rises to w
a before he reaches his second target—with w
a > w
e, hours 
as in Figure 1—or it remains below w
a until he reaches his hours target. In the former case he 
stops at B2. In the latter case, he stops if and only if the new hours disutility cost in the 
income-gain/hours-loss (It > I
r, Ht > H
r) domain he is entering, ] 1 )][ ( ' / ) ( ' [ 1 2 hl h + - - I U H U  
from the upper right cell of Table 1, exceeds w
a. In that case, the optimal stopping point is A3. 
If the hours disutility cost remains less than w
a, the driver continues working. Then, either the 
cost rises to w
a before he reaches the maximum feasible number of hours, or it remains below w
a. 
In the latter case he stops at the maximum feasible number of hours. In the former case he stops at 
a point weakly between points B3 and A3, where B3 represents the income and hours that would 
maximize consumption utility on indifference curve 3 and A3 represents (H
r, w
aH
r). Other things 
equal, the closer η is to one and the larger is λ ≥ 1, the closer the stopping point is to A3.  
Whether or not w
a > w
e, a driver who extrapolates income linearly anticipates passing through 
a sequence of domains such that the hours disutility cost of income weakly increases as hours and 
income accumulate—a reflection of the concavity of reference-dependent utility in I and H. Thus, 
given our assumptions about his expectations, the decision characterized here is globally optimal. 
 
II. Econometric estimates 
This section reports econometric estimates of our reference-dependent model of cabdrivers’ 
labor supply. We use Farber’s (2005, 2008) data and closely follow his econometric strategies, but 
with rational-expectations proxies for the targets and, in the structural estimation, the other 
adjustments to the model suggested by Kıszegi and Rabin’s (2006) theory.
13 
                                                        
13 Farber generously shared his data with us; and they are now posted at http://www.e-aer.org/data/june08/20030605_data.zip. His 
2005 paper gives a detailed description of the data cleaning and relevant statistics. The data are converted from trip sheets recorded   10 
Farber (2005) estimates the effects of cumulative realized income and hours on the probability 
of stopping in a probit model, first imposing linearity and then allowing cumulative income and 
hours to have nonlinear effects (with their marginal effects allowed to differ as they accumulate). 
We begin in Sections II.1-2 by reporting estimates of linear and nonlinear models that parallel 
Farber’s probit models. But instead of estimating using the full sample as he did, we split the 
sample, shift by shift, according to whether a driver’s realized wage at the end of the day, w
a, is 
higher or lower than our rational-expectations proxy for his expected wage, w
e, his full-sample 
mean for that day of the week.
14  If a driver forms his expectations by extrapolating earnings 
approximately linearly, he tends to reach his income (hours) target first when his realized wage is 
higher (lower) than expected. Because the reference-dependent model predicts large differences 
in stopping probabilities across these regimes, splitting the sample allows simple tests that sharply 
distinguish neoclassical and reference-dependent models. For a wide class of reference-dependent 
models, including our structural model in Section I, the probability of stopping increases sharply 
at the first-reached target and again at the second-reached target. By contrast, in a neoclassical 
model, the targets have no effect. This difference between models is robust to the details of the 
structural specification and to variations in the specification of expectations. Sample-splitting 
therefore allows a robust assessment of the gains from a reference-dependent model.
15 
In Section II.3 we use the full sample to estimate a structural reference-dependent model as in 
Farber (2008), but with positively weighted consumption utility as well as gain-loss utility and 
hours as well as income targets as suggested by Kıszegi and Rabin’s (2006). Our structural model 
makes no sharp general predictions: Whether the aggregate stopping probability is more strongly 
influenced by income or hours depends on the estimated parameters and how many shifts have 
realized income higher than expected. Even so, structural estimation provides an important check 
on the model’s ability to reconcile the negative aggregate wage elasticity of hours Camerer et al. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
by the drivers. These contain information about starting/ending time/location and fare (excluding tips) for each trip. There are in 
total 21 drivers and 584 trip sheets, from June 2000 to May 2001. Drivers in the sample all lease their cabs weekly so they are free 
to choose working hours on a daily basis. Because each driver’s starting and ending hours vary widely, and 11 of 21 work some 
night and some day shifts, subleasing seems unlikely. Farber also collected data about weather conditions for control purposes. 
14 Because some drivers have only one working record for certain days, their expectations and realization are then identical by 
construction. As noted above, this creates a simultaneity problem, which might bias our estimates of the importance of gain-loss 
utility. In Section II.1-2’s split-sample estimates, whether we assign observations with only one record to high- or low-wage 
groups does not affect the results. In Section II.3’s structural estimation, we consider alternative ways to address this problem.    
15  The difference between reference-dependent and neoclassical models shows up most clearly with Section II.2’s nonlinear 
(time-varying) effects of income and hours. With Section II.1’s linear (time-invariant) effects, the model’s predictions are 
ambiguous without further information about how the driver’s targets relate to his ideal income and hours. However, we find that 
enough drivers stop at the first target they reach that income (hours) is significantly related to the probability of stopping when 
realized wage is higher (lower) than expected wage.   11 
(1997) found with Farber’s (2008) finding that in the full sample, stopping probabilities are 
significantly related to hours but not income, and to give a useful account of drivers’ labor supply. 
II.1 The Probability of Stopping: Linear Effects 
Table 2 reports the marginal probability effects from the estimation of the probit model with 
linear effects. (Table A1 in Online Appendix A reports the marginal effects for the model with the 
full set of controls.) In each panel of Table 2, the left-hand column replicates Farber’s (2005) 
pooled-sample estimates; the center and right-hand columns report our split-sample estimates. 
In the left-most panel, only total hours, total waiting hours, total break hours and income at the 
end of the trip are used to explain the stopping probability. In Farber’s pooled-sample estimates 
with these controls, all coefficients have the expected signs and the effect of income is highly 
significant, but the effect of hours is small and insignificantly different from zero. Waiting and 
break hours also have significant effects. By contrast, in our split-sample estimates with these 
controls, when realized income is higher than expected (w
a > w
e) the effect of hours is 
insignificant, but the effect of income is large and highly significant. But when realized income is 
lower than expected, the effect of income remains important and hours also becomes significant. 
In the center panel of Table 2 we control for driver heterogeneity, day of the week, and hour of 
the day. In the pooled sample, with these controls, income has only an insignificant effect on the 
stopping probability, while hours worked has a significant effect, apparently supporting Farber’s 
rejection of his income-targeting model. But in our split-sample estimates with these controls, the 
results change: When realized income is higher than expected (w
a > w
e), hours has an effect 
insignificantly different from zero, while income has a large and highly significant effect. But 
when realized income is lower than expected (w
a < w
e), income has a small, insignificant effect. 
The marginal effect of hours remains insignificant, but it increases from 0.3% to 1.1%. 
In the right-most panel of Table 2 we control additionally for weather and location. In the 
pooled sample, with these controls, the estimates are similar to those in the left-most panel, except 
that hours and income now both have significant effects.
16 The split-sample estimates with these 
controls fully support our reference-dependent model, with income but not hours significantly 
affecting the stopping probability when the wage is higher than expected and hours but not 
income significantly affecting the stopping probability when the wage is lower than expected. 
 
                                                        
16 Here our estimates differ from Farber’s conclusions regarding significance. Our computations closely replicated Farber’s point 
coefficient estimates, but in this case not his estimated standard errors.    12 
  Table 2: Probability of Stopping: Marginal Effects for the Probit Model with Linear Effects 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
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Driver dummies  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Day of week  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Hour of day  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log likelihood  -2039.2  -1148.4  -882.6  -1789.5  -1003.8  -753.4  -1767.5  -988.0  -740.0 
Pseudo R
2  0.1516  0.1555  0.1533  0.2555  0.2618  0.2773  0.2647  0.2735  0.2901 
Observation  13461  7936  5525  13461  7936  5525  13461  7936  5525 
Note: Significance levels are computed for the underlying coefficients rather than the marginal effects: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust standard 
errors clustered by shift are included in the brackets. We use Farber’s evaluation point: after 8 total hours, 2.5 waiting hours, 0.5 break hour on a 
dry day with moderate temperatures in midtown Manhattan at 2:00 p.m. Driver fixed effects and day of week dummies are equally weighted. For 
dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated by the difference between values 0 and 1. Among the dummy control variables, only driver 
fixed effects, hour of the day, day of the week, and certain location controls have effects significantly different from 0.  
 
To put these results into perspective, note that a neoclassical model would predict that hours 
have an influence on the probability of stopping that varies smoothly with realized income on any 
given day, without regard to whether realized income is higher than expected. A pure 
income-targeting model such as Farber’s (2008) would predict that there is a jump in the 
probability of stopping when the income target is reached, but that the influence of hours again 
varies smoothly with realized income. By contrast, our model predicts that the probability of 
stopping is more strongly influenced by realized income than hours when income is higher than   13 
expected but more strongly influenced by hours than income when income is lower than expected, 
with a jump again when the income target is reached and now another jump when the hours target 
is reached. Qualitatively, all three models’ predictions are invariant to precisely how the sample is 
split. Our estimates are plainly inconsistent with the neoclassical model and—because hours has a 
strong and significant effect when income is lower than expected but an effect insignificantly 
different from zero when income is higher than expected—with Farber’s income-targeting model 
as well. However, our estimates are fully consistent with our reference-dependent model.
17 
II.2 The Probability of Stopping: Nonlinear Effects 
In order to capture any nonlinear effects realized income and hours may have upon the 
probability of stopping, Farber (2005) also estimated a probit model where income and hours are 
represented by categorical variables over the course of a shift and thereby allowed to have 
unrestricted nonlinear effects. This much more flexible specification of the probability of stopping 
gives a more accurate picture of how it is related to income and hours. Here we replicate Farber’s 
results for this specification, and then re-do the estimates with the sample split as before. 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects from the estimation of the probit model with nonlinear 
effects. The left-hand panel replicates Farber’s (2005) pooled-sample estimates for comparison, 
while the center and right-hand columns report our split-sample estimates. For each column, we 
report marginal effects comparing the probability of stopping of each income and hours category 
to the baseline groups ($150 - $174 income level and the eighth hour). We also report the 
underlying coefficient estimates and likelihood ratio tests of the hypotheses that the marginal 
effects of all income or hours groups are jointly zero. 
The results for the pooled sample are consistent with what Farber (2005) found: Hours 
categories have marginal effects that are jointly significantly different from zero, but income 
categories do not. Allowing a nonlinear hours effect reveals that the effects of hours categories 
vary widely. By contrast, the overall effect of income categories in the pooled sample is smooth, 
with few effects differing significantly from the baseline income category of $150 - $174. 
When the sample is split, the results change dramatically: In both the center panel, which 
reports the results for realized income higher than expected (w
a > w
e), and the right-most panel, 
which reports the results for realized income lower than expected (w
a < w
e), the effects of all 
                                                        
17 One concern is that when the utility cost of hours is highly nonlinear, drivers’ neoclassical utility-maximizing choices resemble 
hours targeting. But neoclassical drivers should still have positive wage elasticity, in contrast to the zero elasticity implied by hours 
targeting. In the low-wage portion of our split sample, the correlation between wage and hours is -0.04, which favors an hours 
targeting explanation.    14 
income and hours categories are significant. This pattern reflects very different drivers’ behavior 
across the split samples, with lower income and higher hours categories having the predominant 
influence on the stopping probability when realized income is higher than expected, but higher 
income and lower hours categories predominant when realized income is lower than expected. 
 
 
Table 3: Probability of Stopping: Probit Model with Nonlinear Effects
 





  Marginal effects  Coefficients  Marginal effects  Coefficients  Marginal effects  Coefficients 
Hour 













































































































































































































p-value (likelihood ratio test) 
All Hours = 0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0574 
All Income = 0  0.1096  0.0123  0.0718 
Observations  13461  7936  5525 
Log-likelihood  -1754.380  -970.929  -735.252 
Notes: Significance levels for marginal effects come from the test for the underlying coefficients. *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust standard errors 
allowing for the possibility of correlation within a shift are given in parentheses. Control variables for driver fixed effects, day of week, hour of 
day, location, and weather, are not reported. As in Farber (2005), fixed effects are weighted equally across days of the week and drivers. We use 
Farber’s evaluation point: at 8 total hours, relative to a baseline income of $150 - $174, on a dry day with moderate temperatures in midtown 
Manhattan at 2:00 p.m.   15 
Figures 2 and 3 graph the probabilities of stopping against income and hours categories. In 
Figure 2, the marginal effects of hours categories are highly nonlinear when the realized wage is 
higher than expected, increasing dramatically after the ninth hour. As one would expect with 
reference-dependence, between the seventh and tenth hours, the marginal effects when realized 
income is lower than expected are higher than when it is higher than expected; while after the 
tenth hour, the marginal effect when realized income is higher than expected rises dramatically. 
In Figure 3, drivers again behave very differently in the split samples, especially as they 
approach their income targets. The marginal effect of income jumps up when income reaches 
$125 - $150 in the high-wage case (presumably as the income target is reached before the hours 
target) and increases dramatically when income reaches $200 - $225 in the low-wage case 
(presumably as the income target is reached after the hours target). Overall, when realized income 
is higher (lower) than expected, the probability of stopping increases first in response to income 
(hours) and then hours (income). Once again, our estimates are inconsistent with the neoclassical 
model and Farber’s income-targeting model, but fully consistent with our reference-dependent 
model. That our split-sample estimates strongly support the model’s predictions even with 
minimal structural restrictions and an imperfect proxy for targets is cause for confidence. 
      In the pooled sample, the effects of deviations from expectations that show up so strongly in 
the split samples largely cancel each other out, yielding the aggregate smoothness of the effect of 
realized income Farber (2005) found. Looking at Figures 2 and 3 together, when realized income 
is higher than expected the probability of stopping first rises when drivers reach income $125 - 
$175, as our estimate of the income target is reached; but at this income level hours has no 
significant effect. However, hours begins to have a strong effect after the tenth hour, as our 
estimate of the hours target is reached. When realized income is lower than expected the pattern is 
reversed, with the probability responding first to hours and then to income.   
II.3 Structural Estimation 
 This subsection estimates a structural model, which parallels Farber’s (2008) model but with 
positively weighted consumption as well as gain-loss utility and hours as well as income targets. 
We follow Farber’s (2008) econometric strategy, except that instead of treating the targets as 
latent variables we treat them as rational expectations, operationalized by using average sample 
realizations of income and hours as proxies for them.
18 
                                                        
18 Based on Farber’s classification of hours into driving hours, waiting hours and break hours, we use only driving and waiting   16 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
hours in our hours calculation. The results are similar when break time is included in the hours target and hours worked.    17 
Section I explains the model. In the structural estimation, as in Farber (2008), we impose the 
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Like Farber, we assume that the driver decides to stop at the end of a given trip if and only if 
his anticipated gain in utility from continuing work for one more trip is negative. Again letting It 
and Ht denote income earned and hours worked by the end of trip t, this requires: 
(4)     E[V(It+1, H t+1|I
r,H
r)] – V(It, H t|I
r,H
r) + ε < 0,  
where 1 1 ( ) t t t I I E f + + = + and 1 1 ( ) t t t H H E h + + = + , and 1 ( ) t E f + and ) ( 1 + t h E are the next trip’s expected 
fare and time (searching and driving), and ε is a normal error with mean c and variance σ
2. 
Online Appendix B gives the details of deriving the likelihood function 
(5)
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where i refers to the shift and t to the trip within a given shift, and  1, 2, 1, , , ( ), it it it a a b r and  2, ( ) it b r  
are shorthands for components of the right-hand side of (3), as explained in Appendix B. Here, 
unlike in a standard probit model, σ is identified through 2,it a , which represents the change in 
income “gain” relative to the income target. However, η and λ cannot be separately identified: 
only 1 – η + ηλ is identified. This is clear from the likelihood function and from Table 1, where 
reference-dependence introduces kinks whose magnitudes are determined by 1 – η + ηλ. Although 
we cannot separately identify η and λ, if we can reject the null hypothesis that 1 – η + ηλ = 1, it 
follows that η ≠ 0. Further, given the model’s restriction that 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, our estimates of 1 – η + ηλ 
imply lower bounds on λ as explained below. 
To make the model operational, we need to specify the shift-level expectations I
r and H
r and 
the trip-level expectations E(ft+1) and E(ht+1). As explained above, following Kıszegi and Rabin 
(2006) we interpret them as a driver’s rational expectations, and proxy them via the averages of 
their natural sample analogs, testing robustness as explained in Section I, footnote 11.    18 
 
Table 4 columns 1 and 3 report estimates for naïve and sophisticated models (referring to how 
the trip-level expectations E(ft+1) and E(ht+1) are formed, as explained shortly), setting I
r and H
r 
equal to the driver’s full-sample averages, day-of-the-week by day-of-the-week 
(“day-of-the-week specific” in Table 4). Because some drivers have only a few observations for 
some days of the week, Table 4 columns 2 and 4 report naïve and sophisticated estimates using a 
second alternative, in which I
r and H
r are aggregated across days of the week, driver by driver 
(“general”). As a further robustness check, in each case we consider alternative models of how 
drivers form E(ft+1) and E(ht+1). Table 4 columns 1 and 2 report estimates for models in which 
each driver treats trip fares and times as i.i.d. across trips and days, proxied by their average 
sample realizations, driver by driver (“naïve” in Table 4). Table 4 columns 3 and 4 report 
estimates for alternative models, in which, in the spirit of Farber’s (2005, Section V.C) analysis, 
drivers form trip-level expectations taking time of day, location, weather, and other relevant 
variables into account (“sophisticated”). Table C1 in Online Appendix C reports the trip fares and 
time estimates whose fitted values are used as proxies for drivers’ expectations in those models.
19 
      Table 4’s estimates confirm and refine the conclusions of Sections II.1-2’s split-sample 
analyses. The fact that 1 – η + ηλ is significantly greater than one implies that η is significantly 
different from zero, indicating that the reference-dependent component of drivers’ preferences has 
                                                        
19  The other variables include day-of-the-week and driver dummies, and average hourly wage across drivers for each calendar date 
to capture any day-to-day variation known to the drivers but not captured by the constant term. Surprisingly, there is not much 
variation by time of day, but there is a lot of variation across locations, drivers, and calendar dates.   






























































Observations  13461  13461  13461  13461 
Log-likelihood  -1687.8105  -1762.426  -1696.6684  -1761.2436  
Notes: Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
+ Significance level corresponds to the null hypothesis that
 1 – η + ηλ = 1. 
Robust standard errors clustered by shift are given in parentheses. Income variables are divided by 100. Controls include driver 
fixed effects, day of week, hour of day, location, and weather.   19 
positive weight. It also suggests that the coefficient of loss aversion λ is greater than one, with 
lower bounds ranging from 1.254 to 2.375 across Table 4’s alternative specifications, consistent 
with previous estimates. To get a sense of the possible magnitudes of λ and η, Table 5 reports the 
values of η implied by our estimates of 1 – η + ηλ for a range of reasonable values of λ. Different 
specifications favor gain-loss utility to different degrees, but in general the weight of gain-loss 
utility is nonnegligible.  
 

















1 – η + ηλ =1.417  1 – η + ηλ =1.254  1 – η + ηλ =2.375  1 – η + ηλ =1.592 
1.5  0.834  0.508  -  - 
2  0.417  0.254  -  0.592 
2.5  0.278  0.169  0.917  0.395 
3  0.209  0.127  0.688  0.296 
3.5  0.167  0.102  0.550  0.237 
4  0.139  0.085  0.458  0.197 
4.5  0.119  0.073  0.393  0.169 
5  0.104  0.064  0.344  0.148 
 


















wage  θ = 0.219 
ρ = 0.128 
1 – η + ηλ =1.417 
θ =0.176 
ρ = 0.363 
1 – η + ηλ =1.254 
θ =0.090 
ρ = 0.390 
1 – η + ηλ =2.375 
θ = 0.022 
ρ = 1.122 
1 – η + ηλ =1.592 
5%  $17.9  3.150  1.954  6.899  6.899 
10%  $19.1  5.229  2.337  6.899  6.899 
25%  $21.0  6.899  3.034  7.681  7.469 
50%  $23.3  6.899  4.041  6.923  6.923 
75%    $25.9  6.899  5.408  6.899  6.899 
90%  $28.5  6.899  5.660  6.899  6.899 
95%  $30.8  6.899  5.237  6.899  6.899 
Correlation of wage and 
optimal working hours  0.709  0.942  -0.256  -0.257 
 
To illustrate the implications of the estimated utility function parameters under Table 4’s 
alternative specifications, Table 6 presents the optimal stopping times, in hours, implied by our   20 
structural estimates of the reference-dependent model for each specification and for representative 
percentiles of the observed distribution of realized wages. The implied stopping times seem quite 
reasonable, especially for the sophisticated models, reflecting the lower estimated disutilities of 
hours for those models.
20 
Despite the influence of the targets on stopping probabilities, the heterogeneity of realized 
wages yields a smooth aggregate relationship between stopping probability and realized income, 
so the model can reconcile Farber’s (2005) finding that aggregate stopping probabilities are 
significantly related to hours but not income with a negative aggregate wage elasticity of hours as 
found by Camerer et al. (1997). In our model, the stopping decisions of some drivers, on some 
days, will be more heavily influenced by their income targets, in which case their wage elasticities 
will tend to be negative, while the decisions of other drivers on other days will be more heavily 
influenced by their hours targets, in which case their wage elasticities will be close to zero. When 
1 – η + ηλ is large enough, and with a significant number of observations in the former regime, the 
model will yield a negative aggregate wage elasticity of hours. To illustrate, Table 6 also reports 
each specification’s implication for the aggregate correlation of wage and optimal working hours, 
a proxy for the wage elasticity. The sophisticated cases (columns 3 and 4), with more reasonable 
estimates of the disutility of hours, imply negative correlations (each close to the aggregate 
sample correlation of -0.2473). By contrast, the naïve cases, with unreasonably high consumption 
disutility for hours, imply positive correlations.
21      
Overall, our structural model avoids Farber’s (2008) criticism that drivers’ estimated targets 
are too unstable and imprecisely estimated to allow a useful reference-dependent model of labor 
supply. In this comparatively small sample, there remains some ambiguity about the parameters 
of consumption utility ρ and θ. But the key function 1 – η + ηλ of the parameters of gain-loss 
utility is plausibly and precisely estimated, robust to the specification of proxies for drivers’ 
                                                        
20 Estimates that allow for differences across days of the week tend to imply lower estimates of the elasticity of the marginal rate 
of substitution ρ, making the neoclassically optimal stopping times extremely sensitive to the wage. Table D1 in Online Appendix 
D gives the implied average stopping probabilities for various ranges relative to the targets. The estimates imply comparatively 
little bunching around the targets, perhaps because consumption utility has almost the same weight as gain-loss utility. Even so, the 
targets have a very strong influence on the stopping probabilities: As in the nonlinear split-sample estimates (Table 3, Figures 2-3), 
the second-reached target has a stronger effect than the first-reached target. 
21 It would be ideal if we could calculate the wage elasticity of hours implied by our structural model, to compare with Farber’s 
(2005, Table 3) estimates. But because our structural model only estimates the probability of stopping at the end of each trip, there 
is no completely sensible way to infer a driver’s optimal hours. If we approximate by equating a driver’s optimal hours with the 
trip for which he has the highest probability of stopping, the wage elasticities for the four models in Table 6 are respectively -0.730, 
-0.702, -0.683, and -0.674, close to Farber’s estimates, which range from -0.637 to -0.688. The estimated optimal stopping times in 
Table 6 provides another possible way to approximate the wage elasticity implied by our model, but this seems less informative 
because it is sensitive to our simplifying assumption that the daily wage is constant.        21 
expectations, and comfortably within the range that indicates reference-dependent preferences. 
Our estimates suggest that a more comprehensive investigation of how drivers forecast their 
income from experience, with larger datasets, will yield a useful model of reference-dependent of 
driver’s labor supply that significantly improves upon the neoclassical model.
22 
III. Conclusion 
Although the neoclassical model of labor supply predicts a positive wage elasticity of hours, 
Camerer et al. (1997) found a strongly negative elasticity of hours with respect to realized 
earnings for New York City cabdrivers. Farber (2005, 2008), analyzing new data on a different set 
of New York City cabdrivers, found a similarly negative relationship. To explain these results, 
Camerer et al. proposed an income-targeting explanation, in the spirit of Prospect Theory, in 
which drivers have daily income targets and work until the target is reached, and so work less on 
days when realized earnings per hour is high, with little of the positive wage elasticity of hours 
predicted by the neoclassical model.  
Farber (2008) was the first to estimate a model explicitly derived from income targeting, using 
the dataset created for Farber (2005). He estimates drivers’ income targets as latent variables with 
driver-specific means and driver-independent variance, both assumed constant across days of the 
week—thus allowing the target to vary across days for a given driver, but only as a random effect. 
He finds that a sufficiently rich parameterization of his income-targeting model has a better fit 
than a standard neoclassical specification, and that the probability of stopping increases 
significantly and substantially once the income target is reached; but that his model cannot 
reconcile the strong increase in stopping probability at the target with the aggregate smoothness of 
the relationship between stopping probability and realized income. Further, the random effect is 
large but imprecisely estimated, from which he concludes that drivers’ income targets are too 
unstable and imprecisely estimated to yield a useful reference-dependent model of labor supply. 
In this paper we use Farber’s data to estimate a model based on Kıszegi and Rabin’s (2006) 
theory of reference-dependent preferences, which is more general than Farber’s model in most 
respects but takes a more specific position on how targets are determined. In the model, a driver 
                                                        
22 We believe that Farber’s (2008) finding to the contrary may have been due to his decision to treat the income target as a latent 
variable; to the constraints he imposed, partly for computational rather than economic reasons, in estimating it; and to the fact that 
he estimated his income-targeting model and neoclassical models separately instead of nesting them as suggested by Kıszegi and 
Rabin’s (2006) theory. Further, although Farber argues that a reference-dependent model has too many degrees of freedom—a 
coefficient of loss aversion as well as heterogeneous income targets—to be fairly compared with a neoclassical model, our analysis 
reduces the difference in degrees of freedom by defining the targets via rational expectations. 
   22 
has a daily reference point or target for hours as well as income. His preferences reflect both the 
standard consumption utility of income and leisure and gain-loss utility. As in Farber’s (2008) 
income-targeting model, the driver is loss-averse; but working longer than the hours target is now 
a loss, just as earning less than the income target is. We follow Farber’s (2005, 2008) econometric 
strategies closely, but instead of treating targets as latent variables we treat them as rational 
expectations, operationalized using average sample realizations of income and hours as proxies.  
Estimating linear and nonlinear probit models of the probability of stopping as in Farber’s 
(2005) analysis, but with the sample split according to whether realized income is higher or lower 
than our proxy for a driver’s expected income on a given day, we find very clear evidence of 
reference-dependence, with the probability of stopping work strongly influenced by realized 
income (but not hours) when the realized wage is higher than expected, and by hours (but not 
income) when the wage is lower than expected. The two wage regimes have roughly equal 
weights, so that the heterogeneity of realized wages yields a smooth aggregate relationship 
between stopping probability and realized income, as in Farber’s (2005) full-sample estimation. 
But when the wage is higher than expected the wage elasticity of hours is strongly negative, and 
when it is lower the elasticity is zero. This allows the model to reconcile Farber’s finding that in 
the full sample stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income, with the 
negative aggregate wage elasticity of hours found by Camerer et al. (1997). 
Using the full sample to estimate a structural reference-dependent model as in Farber (2008), 
but with the modifications suggested by Kıszegi and Rabin’s theory, confirms and refines the 
results of our split-sample analysis. The parameter estimates are sensible; and the key function of 
the parameters of gain-loss utility is plausibly and precisely estimated, and comfortably within the 
range that indicates reference-dependent preferences. Finally, the model avoids Farber’s (2008) 
criticism that drivers’ targets are too unstable and imprecisely estimated to yield a useful 
reference-dependent model of labor supply. It does this partly by nesting consumption and 
gain-loss utility and allowing hours as well as income targets, but mostly by treating the targets as 
rational expectations estimated from natural sample proxies, rather than as latent variables. 
Overall, our estimates suggest that a more comprehensive investigation of how drivers 
forecast their income from experience, with larger datasets, is likely to yield a 
reference-dependent model of drivers’ labor supply that significantly improves upon the 
neoclassical model. However, although our results suggest that Kıszegi and Rabin’s   23 
rational-expectations theory of targets is very promising, like Farber we take the targets as given 
rather than modeling how they are determined. Pending further analysis of how expectations are 
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Online Appendix A: Coefficients for Table 2’s Probit Model of the Probability of Stopping 
with Linear Effects with the Full Set of Controls Used in the Analysis 
 
Table A1: Probability of Stopping: Probit Model with Linear Effects and Full Set of Controls 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable 






































































































































































Driver dummies  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Day of week  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Hour of day  -  -  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log likelihood  -2039.2  -1148.4  -882.6  -1789.5  -1003.8  -753.4  -1767.5  -988.0  -740.0 
Pseudo R
2  0.1516  0.1555  0.1533  0.2555  0.2618  0.2773  0.2647  0.2735  0.2901 
Observation  13461  7936  5525  13461  7936  5525  13461  7936  5525 
Note: Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust standard errors clustered by shift are included in the brackets.  
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Online Appendix B: Derivation of the Likelihood Function in the Structural Estimation 
Given a driver’s preferences,  
(B1)  [ ] ) ( 1 ) ( 1
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We assume the driver decides to stop at the end of a given trip if and only if his anticipated gain in 
utility from continuing work for one more trip is negative. Again letting It and Ht denote income 
earned and hours worked by the end of trip t, this requires: 
(B2)      E[V(It+1, H t+1|I
r,H
r)] – V(It, H t|I
r,H
r) + ε < 0,  
where 1 1 ( ) t t t I I E f + + = + and 1 1 ( ) t t t H H E h + + = + , 1 ( ) t E f + and ) ( 1 + t h E are the next trip’s expected fare 
and time (searching and driving), and ε is a normal error with mean c and variance σ
2.  
     The likelihood function can now be written as: 
(B3)   
584
1, 2, 1, 2,
1 1
ln [((1 )( ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ))/ ]
1 1 1
i T
it it it it it it
i t
A B a a b b c
q q q
h r h l l r r s
r r r = =
F - - + + - - +
+ + + ∑ ∑ . 
where i denotes the shift and t the trip within a given shift, and 
  , 1 , it i t i t A I I + = - . 
 
1 1
, 1 , ( ) it i t i t B H H
r r r
+ +
+ = - . 
 
, 1 , 1, , 1 , ( 0) ( 0) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) r r
i t i i t i
r r
it i t i i t i I I I I a I I I I
+ + - £ - £ = - - - . 
 
, 1 , 2, , 1 , ( 0) ( 0) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) r r
i t i i t i
r r
it i t i i t i I I I I a I I I I
+ + - > - > = - - - . 
 
, 1 ,
1 1 1 1
1, , 1 , ( 0) ( 0) ( ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) r r
i t i i t i
r r
it i t i i t i H H H H b H H H H
r r r r r
+
+ + + +
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Note that  
  1, 2, it it it A a a = +  and    
  1, 2, ( ) ( ) it it it B b b r r = + . 
 
Substituting these equations yields a reduced form for the likelihood function: 
(B4) 
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Online Appendix C: Trip Fares and Time Estimates Whose Fitted Values are Used as 
Proxies for Drivers’ Expectations in Table 4 
 
Table C1: Trip Fares and Time Estimates Whose Fitted Values 
Are Used as Proxies for Drivers’ Expectations in Table 4 
  Time  Fare  Day of the Week  Time  Fare 
Clock hours  Day of the Week 
0   -.079  -.005  Monday  .019**  .002 
  (.054)  (.009)    (.008)  (.002) 
1   -.060  -.002  Tuesday  .011  .002 
  (.056)  (-.002)    (.007)  (.002) 
2   -.040  .003    Wednesday  .019***  .003* 
  (.059)  (.010)    (.007)  (.002) 
3   -.030  -  Thursday  .026***  .006*** 
  (.065)  -    (.007)  (.002) 
4   -  .008  Friday  .019***  .005*** 
  -  (.015)    (.007)  (.002) 
5 - 10   -.040  -.005  Saturday  -  - 
  (.053)  (.009)    -  - 
11   -.025  |-.006   Sunday  .007  .005** 
  (.054)  (.009)    (.009)  (.002) 
12  -.033  -.006    ID 1  .049**  .003 
  (.054)  (-.006)    (.021)  (.005) 
13   -.034  -.003  ID 2  .022  .011* 
  (.054)  (.009)    (.025)  (.006) 
14  -.032  -.002  ID 3  -  - 
  (.054)  (.009)    -  - 
15  -.046  -.001  ID 4  .027  .001 
  (.054)  (.009)    (.020)  (.005) 
16  -.060  -.005  ID 5  .070 ***  .013*** 
  (.054)  (.009)    (.022)  (.005) 
17  -.074  -.007  ID 6  .008  .005 
  (.053)  (.009)    (.025)  (.006) 
18  -.079    .010  ID 7  .036*  .003 
  (.053)  (.009)    (.022)  (.005) 
19  -.095*  -.012  ID 8  .042**  .002 
  (.053)  (.009)    (.020)  (.005) 
20  -.069  -.005  ID 9  .013  .001 
  (.053)  (.009)    (.021)  (.001) 
21  -.091*  -.006  ID 10  .029  .002 
  (.053)  (.009)    (.020)  (.005) 
22  -.089*  -.005  ID 11  -.006  .002 
  (.053)  (.009)    (.026)  (.006) 
23  -.060  .002  ID 12  .063***  .009* 
  (.054)  (.009)    (.024)  (.005) 
Mini temp < 
30  -.001  -.002  ID 13  -.027  -.008 
  (.006)  (.001)    (.023)  (.005) 
Max temp > 
80  .023***  .003**  ID 14  .043*  .009 
  (.006)  (.001)    (.022)  (.005) 
Hourly rain  .003  -.015  ID 15  -.003  -.007 
  (.091)  (.021)    (.022)  (.005)   27 
Daily snow  .000  .000  ID 16  .033  .004 
  (.004 )  (.001)    (.020)  (.005) 
Downtown  -.083**  .001  ID 17  .031  .000 
  (.041)  (.009)    (.031)  (.005) 
Midtown  -.120***  -.007  ID 18  .053***  .008 
  (.041)  (.009)    (.019)  (.004) 
Uptown  -.103 **  -.005  ID 19  .103***  .021*** 
  (.041)  (.009)    (.020)  (.005) 
Bronx  -  -  ID 20  .012  -.000 
  -  -    (.019)  (.004) 
Queens  .230***  .086 
***  ID 21  .054***  .003 
  (.049)  (.011)    (.021)  (.005 
Brooklyn  .097**  .040 
***  -.362***  .005** 
  (.046)  (.010) 
Average wage
+ 
(.076)  (.017) 
Kennedy 
Airport  .439***  .173***  Constant  .475***  .048*** 
  (.046)  (.011)    (.072)  (.014) 
LaGuardia 
Airport  .231***  .106***       
  (.043)  (.010)       
Others  -.037  .012       
  (.054)  (.012)       
R
2  0.1257  0.1865    0.1257  0.1865 
Observations  12877    12877 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Fare and time (waiting and driving) for the next trip are jointly estimated as 
seemingly unrelated regressions. 
+ Average hourly wage across drivers for the same calendar date. 
 
Online Appendix D: Implied Average Probabilities of Stopping for Various Ranges 
 



















Before income target  .022  .025  .023  .025 
At income target  .161  .124  .165  .130 
In between two targets  .115  .102  .134  .120 
At hours target  .238  .167  .233  .166 




Before hours target  .022  .024  .031  .030 
At hours target  .139  .134  .149  .135 
In between two targets  .168  .164  .178  .149  
At income target  .266  .245  .282  .260 
Above income target  .283  .234  .305  .254 
Note: The probability of each range is calculated from the average predicted probabilities of trips. A range is two-sided with tolerance 0.1: 
before target means < 0.95×target; at target means > 0.95×target but < 1.05×target; and above target means > 1.05×target. The probabilities 
are first computed for each driver and range and then averaged across drivers within each range, hence do not sum to one.   
 